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Abstract: 
This study seeks to strengthen the existing literature by investigating the relationship between governance 
indicators and FDI inflows for the emerging countries (ECs) using a dynamic panel gravity model approach over 
the period 1996~2014. The empirical results reveal that among the six indicators of good governance, political 
stability, government effectiveness and regulatory quality are found to be robust determinants for FDI 
attractiveness in Emerging countries. The remaining three indicators, i.e. voice and accountability, rule of law, 
and control of corruption are found significantly and negatively associated with FDI inflows. The empirical 
results show also that larger per capita GDP difference between the investing partner and host country, high level 
of trade openness, low level of inflation rate, and better infrastructure are crucial factors to speed-up FDI inflows 
in ECs. However, this study provides strong evidence that ECs depict a large gap with regard to the quality of 
institutions and other macroeconomic factors and thereby their ability to attract FDI. To conclude, policymakers 
are required to improve the quality of institutions and business climate in order to attract more FDI in these 
countries. 
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1. Introduction  
In a world characterized by an economic activity driven by international trade and capital flows, the foreign 
direct investment (FDI) attractiveness by both developed and developing countries has become imperative and 
almost strategic for the economic decision-makers because it contributes to economic development through 
increasing capital accumulation and production capacity, transferring knowledge, enhancing competitiveness and 
promoting macroeconomic stability (Borensztein et al., 1998). This is particularly the case for the emerging 
countries (ECs). 
     In front of the competition which becoming increasingly intense between countries on the one hand and the 
unequal distribution of FDIs in the world on the other, each country is first called to build its advantages, adapt 
to the new economic data based on integration and globalization, and capture the elements of institutional 
development that permits it to receive more FDI. However, FDI is less determined by fundamental elements 
such as governance infrastructure, economic freedom, economic and political stability, which are insufficient 
conditions but necessary. Therefore, the importance of institutional factors for FDI has drawn high attention of 
academic researchers since the last few years. However, several studies highlighted that countries with sound 
governance infrastructure are likely to attract more FDI inflows (e.g., Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Jensen, 
2003; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Mengistu and Adhikary, 2011; Morrissey and 
Udomkerdmongkol, 2012) because private investments cannot be protected in an environment characterized by 
poor governance (weak protection of property rights, high levels of corruption, or excessive regulation and 
bureaucracy). Likewise, poor governance serves to bring additional costs to FDI and increases uncertainty
 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Asiedu, 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). 
     It is well-established that a host country is more attractive for FDI when it has sound policies and regulations, 
and sound macroeconomic conditions. Starting from this fact, the key policy questions are: what role does 
institutional quality play in attracting FDI and which institutional factors lead FDI inflows in ECs? Indeed, 
Dunning (2002) argue that foreign investments have becoming increasingly susceptible to the institutional 
factors as their motives have shifted from market and resource seeking to more efficiency seeking. Also, Gray 
and Jarosse (1993) suggest that multinationals want to operate in an environment characterized by reduced 
uncertainty and transaction costs. This environment is related to the regulation inherent in the legislation 
governing the activity of multinational companies (MNCs). Such regulation can conceal obstacles that impede 
the implementation of MNCs and thus cause a diversion effect of FDI flows to countries with more flexible and 
transparent legislation. 
The available literature reveal that though research on FDI and their linkage with institutional factors using 
different set of countries, data and estimation techniques are voluminous. However, the relationship between 
institutional quality and FDI flows in the context of ECs is yet not well empirically explored. Therefore, the 
main objective of this paper is to address this gap and to give empirical evidence of the role of institutional 
factors in making ECs more attractive to FDI. Specifically, we investigate the importance of good governance 
for inward FDI in ECs by using a dynamic panel gravity model. We further contribute to the literature by 
employing a variety of macroeconomic and institutional factors to identify which aspects of macroeconomic and 
institutional factors affect inward FDI in the ECs. 
     The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review. Section 3 describes the 
data and the econometric methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The relationship between institutional factors and FDI inflows remains debatable in empirical research for a long 
period and time. For instance, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) found that corruption has a significant negative 
impact on FDI location. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) look into the role of institutional quality in both 52 host and 
source countries. Their results revealed that inward FDI is significantly influenced by public efficiency which 
includes tax system efficiency, easiness to create a business, transparency and lack of corruption, contract law, 
and security of property rights. Busse and Hefeker (2007) examined the link between political risk, institutions 
and FDI inflows for a panel of 83 developing countries during the period 1984~2003, and showed that many 
sub-components of political risk (government stability, quality of bureaucracy, law and order, democratic 
accountability, corruption and ethnic tensions, and internal and external conflict) have significant impacts on 
FDI inflows. Similarly, Gani (2007) analyzed the link between good governance and FDI inflows for a group of 
70 Asian and Latin American countries over the period 1996~2002. 
     Mengistu and Adhikary (2011) investigated the effect of good governance on FDI inflows for 15 Asian 
countries for the period 1996~2007. Their results showed that FDI inflows in Asian countries are significantly 
influenced by the indicators of good governance. Similarly, Gangi and Abdrazak (2012) examined the impact of 
good governance on inward FDI for 50 African countries. They found that three out of the six indicators of good 
governance (voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and rule of law) have significant and positive 
relationship with FDI. The remaining of dimensions (political stability and absence of violence, regulatory 
quality and control of corruption) are found statistically insignificant. Bellos and Subasat (2012) investigated the 
link between corruption and FDI for 24 Latin American countries for the period 1985~2008 by using a panel 
data gravity model. Further, Subasat and Bellos (2013) examined the impact of institutional factors of FDI for 
18 Latin American countries over the period 1985~2008 by using a panel data gravity model. Their empirical 
results suggest that poor governance enhances FDI not only in the transition countries but also in Latin America. 
     More recently, Kurul and Yalta (2017) analyzed the effect of governance indicators on FDI inflows for 113 
developing countries over the period 2002~2012 by using a dynamic panel approach. They found that voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness and control of corruption have significant positive influences on FDI 
inflows. The remaining three dimensions (political stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality, and rule 
of low) do not significantly affect inward FDI. In the same context, Hossain and Rahman (2017) investigated the 
relationship between good governance and FDI inflows in 80 developing countries during the period 1998~2014. 
Their empirical results reveal that FDI inflows are significantly and positively affected by all good governance 
indicators. 
 
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Data  
The sample includes 25 emerging host countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Hong Kong, Greece, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, 
Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, and Venezuela) and 17 source countries, 
namely Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, South Korea , Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA.  
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Data on FDI stocks are downloaded from the OECD database. Data on real GDP, per capita GDP, inflation, 
population aged between 15 and 64, which is used as a proxy of labor force, trade openness, and the number of 
internet users which is used as a proxy of infrastructure are taken from the World Development Indicators 
database (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator). In addition, data on production capacity of crude oil, natural gas 
and other liquids in thousands of barrels are obtained from U.S. Energy Information Administration online 
database. The data on governance indicators are taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project online 
database (http://data.worldbank.org/govindicators). 
 
3.2. Dynamic Gravity Model Specification 
 
To examine the dynamic effects of institutional factors on FDI for the ECs during the period 1996~2014, we 
employed the following augmented dynamic panel gravity model: 
 
                                                        
                                                                 
                                                                     
                           
    (1) 
where FDI is the bilateral FDI stock from country i to country j (current USD), GDPi and GDPj are the GDPs of 
country i (j), DIST is the geographic distance from the economic center of country i to country j, VAC is voice 
and accountability, PSTAB is political stability and absence of violence, GOVE is government effectiveness, RQ 
is regulatory quality, ROL is rule of law, COC is control of corruption, DIFGDP is the difference in per capita 
GDP between country i and j. LAF is the labor force in the host country. TRADE is the degree of trade openness 
of country i, INFR is the infrastructure measured by the number of internet users in country i, OIL is the 
production capacity of crude oil, natural gas and other liquids in thousands of barrels of the country i, INF 
determines the inflation rate of the country i, LANG is the sharing of a common language between the two 
countries, RELIG is a dummy for countries that sharing a same religion, BORD is the act of sharing a common 
border, λ is the adjustment parameter, u is the error term. 
     We estimate Eq. (1) using two-step robust system-GMM estimators (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). The system-GMM is the most commonly used method to capture the endogeneity problems and 
provides consistent estimates. The soundness of the instruments is conducted by two diagnostic tests. The 
Hansen (1982) J-test over-identifying restrictions for the validity of GMM instruments variables and the 
Arellano-Bond AR (1) and AR (2) tests for detect autocorrelation in the level series. However, all the regression 
results (column 1-6) in Table 1, found there is no autocorrelation problem in the level series applying Arellano-
Bond AR (1) and AR (2) process and over identified restriction are valid in the model using Hansen J-test. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The summary statistics of the variables reported in Appendix A1 show that the average inward FDI stocks 
exhibit a wide variation in the sample period, which indicate a contrasted performance among the ECs in terms 
of FDI stocks. Regarding the governance indicators, we can observe that there is a large gap between countries 
with regard to their quality of institutions.  
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The empirical results presented in Table 1 have shown good results for the gravity variables as distance and the 
size of the GDP variables are highly significant and have the expected positive signs. The real GDP of the host 
countries, which capture the effect of the country’s economic size, has a strong positive effect on FDI inflows in 
all the models except. For instance, an increase of 1% in real GDP leads significantly to an increase in FDI to 
ECs by about 0.146% points. This implies that the richer a country the more FDI it attracts. Likewise, the 
distance variable is significantly and negatively associated with FDI, indicating that an increase in geographical 
distance or cost of transportation leads significantly to a decrease in FDI. 
     Regarding the governance indicators, the results show that FDI in ECs is positively and significantly affected 
by political stability and absence of violence, this implies that a 1% increase in effort to improve political 
soundness leads to a surge in the FDI to ECs by 0.079% points. This further implies that good political stability 
that related to political soundness and government ability faces to unconstitutional means including politically 
motivated violence and terrorism is indeed essential for foreign firms to work effectively. Government 
effectiveness has a positive and significant impact on FDI, indicating that an increase of 1% in effort to enhance 
government effectiveness leads to a surge in FDI to ECs by 0.191% points. This implies that good governance 
effectiveness necessary for well-functioning markets decreases the cost of doing business and therefore boosts 
FDI activity. Regulatory quality has also a positive and significant effect on FDI, indicating that a 1% increase in 
effort to improve government regulatory effectiveness leads to a 0.254% points increase in FDI. This provides 
evidence that improved government regulatory effectiveness serves to create a favorable business climate by 
hearten foreign investors to undertake long-term investment.  
     Further, voice and accountability has a negative and statistically significant effect on FDI inflows, revealing 
that a decrease of 1% in effort to improve democratic accountability leads to a decrease in FDI by -0.239% 
points. This implies that poor government that reflects weaknesses in exercising policies to improve the 
participation and trust of people in political system serves to reduce FDI inflows. Rule of law has also a negative 
and significant impact on FDI inflows, implying that a 1% decrease in effort to improve transparency and 
strengthen the rule of law leads to a decrease in FDI inflows by around -0.163% points. This provides a further 
indication that ECs with weak effective, impartial and transparent legal systems and poor protection of property 
rights and civil rights tend to attract less FDI. Our results show also that control of corruption has a negative and 
statistically significant sign, revealing that a 1% decrease in effort to improve the transparency of corruption in 
ECs leads to a decrease in FDI to ECs by -0.085% points. This gives us evidence that corruption plays a 
‘‘grabbing hand’’ role for FDI, and hence high levels of corruption discourage more inward FDI to ECs.  
     Regarding the pull factors, our results show that larger per capita GDP difference between the investing 
partner and host country, higher level of trade openness, lower level of inflation rate, the availability and cheap 
labour costs, and better infrastructure are crucial factors to speed-up inward FDI to ECs. Table 2 summarizes our 
main findings.  
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Table 1. Results of dynamic panel system-GMM model 
 
Dependent variable : lnFDI 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    
   
lnFDIij (t-1) 0.477
***
 (0.082) 0.475
***
 (0.084) 0.480
***
 (0.083) 0.479
***
 (0.090) 0.479
***
 (0.084) 0.479
***
 (0.083) 
lnGDPi 0.573
***
 (0.084) 0.568
***
 (0.075) 0.570
***
 (0.070) 0.578
***
 (0.081) 0.573
***
 (0.069) 0.575
***
 (0.071) 
lnGDPj 0.145
***
 (0.040) 0.144
***
 (0.038) 0.149
***
 (0.043) 0.146
***
 (0.043) 0.148
***
 (0.038) 0.146*** (0.040) 
lnDIFGDP 0.363
**
 (0.137) 0.354
**
 (0.124) 0.345
**
 (0.112) 0.368
**
 (0.142) 0.349
**
 (0.135) 0.347** (0.141) 
lnTRADE 0.405
***
 (0.128) 0.402
***
 (0.086) 0.399
***
 (0.090) 0.386
***
 (0.118) 0.395
***
 (0.113) 0.389*** (0.105) 
lnOIL 0.013
*
 (0.007) 0.012
*
 (0.005) 0.017
*
 (0.007) 0.011
*
 (0.016) 0.014
*
 (0.022) 0.015* (0.018) 
lnINF -0.005
**
 (0.001) -0.006
**
 (0.002) -0.006
**
 (0.001) -0.005
**
 (0.002) -0.007
**
 (0.002) -0.006** (0.002) 
lnLAF 0.418
***
 (0.115) 0.396
***
 (0.124) 0.376
***
 (0.097) 0.408
***
 (0.113) 0.389
***
 (0.081) 0.385*** (0.108) 
lnINFR 0.112
***
 (0.017) 0.116
***
 (0.019) 0.122
***
 (0.019) 0.118
***
 (0.019) 0.115
***
 (0.019) 0.114*** (0.018) 
lnDIST -0.562
**
 (0.108) -0.564
**
 (0.106) -0.552
**
 (0.124) -0.571
**
 (0.141) -0.569** (0.140) -0.565** (0.136) 
LANG 0.728 (0.308) 0.753 (0.263) 0.746 (0.446) 0.758 (0.433) 0.763 (0.412) 0.760 (0.383) 
BORD 0.825 (0.270) 0.828 (0.247) 0.835 (0.265) 0.838 (0.235) 0.842 (0.188) 0.845 (0.212) 
RELIG 0.798
***
 (0.185) 0.789
***
 (0.178) 0.885
***
 (0.228) 0.880
***
 (0.224) 0.877*** (0.216) 0.875*** (0.211) 
VAC -0.240
*
 (0.130) 
    
      
PSTAB 
 
 0.079
***
 (0.021) 
  
      
GOVE 
 
 
  
0.191
**
 (0.072)       
RQ 
 
 
    
0.254
**
 (0.090)     
ROL 
 
 
    
  -0.163
*
 (0.041)   
COC 
 
 
    
    -0.085
*
 (0.018) 
  
 
    
      
Constant
 
-31.419
***
 (3.114) -30.155
***
 (2.288) -28.424
***
 (2.256) -29.245
***
 (2.348) -29.491
***
 (2.795) -29.491*** (2.778) 
F-statistic (1976.12)
***
 (1981.27)
***
 (1975.22)
***
 (1976.18)
***
 (1982.07)
***
 (1978.12)
***
 
AR (1) test (p-value) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
AR (2) test (p-value) 0.314 0.312 0.312 0.312 0.314 0.315 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.132 0.128 0.135 0.115 0.132 0.140 
N/Group number 6800/425 6800/425 6800/425 6800/425 6800/425 6800/425 
 
Notes: Corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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5. Conclusions  
 
This study explored the relationship between institutional factors and FDI in ECs for the period 1996~2014 
using a dynamic panel gravity model approach. The regression results show that FDI is strongly affected by 
government effectiveness, political stability and regulatory quality, while voice and accountability, rule of law 
and control of corruption have significant negative influences on inward FDI. One can be argued that countries 
that have good governance infrastructure, which secure property rights and civil rights, enforcement status of 
laws in case of violation of rules and contracts, guarantee the political stability and assurance the transparency 
and lack of corruption tend to attract more FDI than countries with poor governance. The empirical results also 
provide evidence that FDI-promoting effect of good governance may be an important channel of their overall 
influence on growth and development levels. Under this fact, policymakers should take into account that healthy 
economic and political climate offer an attractive opportunity for foreign investors and they are therefore 
significant measures that political stability be maintained in ECs which may create a dynamic spillover power in 
their economies. Furthermore, it should be noted that to encourage FDI to ECs and provide large motivation for 
foreign investors, a strong commitment by the policy makers is essential to ensure the respect for the rule of law. 
Finally, encourage regional integration agreements to harmonize regulatory frameworks and the business climate 
under which MNCs operate. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of main findings  
Variables Impact on inward FDI Expected sign Found sign 
VAC a significant negative impact + – 
PSTAB a significant positive impact + + 
GOVE a significant positive impact + + 
RQ a significant positive impact + + 
ROL a significant negative impact + – 
COC a significant negative impact + – 
GDPj a significant positive impact + + 
DIFGDP a significant positive impact + + 
TRADE a significant positive impact + + 
OIL a significant positive impact + + 
INF a significant negative impact – – 
LAF a significant positive impact + + 
INFR a significant positive impact + + 
DIST a significant negative impact – – 
LANG a significant positive impact + + 
BORD a significant positive impact + + 
RELIG a significant positive impact + + 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Description of variables 
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. 
FDI Bilateral FDI stock from country i to country j (current USD) 7.845 2.553 
GDPi Real GDP of the source country (constant 2005 USD) 27.521 1.350 
GDPj Real GDP of the host country (constant 2005 USD) 26.475 1.314 
DIFGDP Difference in GDP per capita in thousands USD between the source country 
and host country 
10.309 0.674 
LAF Labour force in the host country, measured by the total population aged 
between 15 and 64 
17.122 1.540 
TRADE The degree of trade openness of the host country,  measured by the ratio of 
exports plus imports to GDP 
3.983 0.656 
INFR Infrastructure, measured by the number of internet users in the host country 4.962 2.503 
OIL Production capacity of crude oil, natural gas and other liquids in thousands 
of barrels of the host country 
9.924 2.997 
INF Inflation rate in the investing country as a proxy of macroeconomic stability 9.555 16.494 
VAC Voice and accountability that measures the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, association, and a free media. 
-0.264 0.657 
PSTAB Political stability and the absence of violence to capture the ability 
perceptions of the government’s power to the likelihood of political 
instability and politically motivated violence and terrorism. 
0.288 0.831 
GOVE Government effectiveness to capture the quality of public service, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies. 
0.267 0.612 
REQ Regulatory quality to capture the ability perceptions of the government to 
formulate and implement sound economic policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
0.251 0.671 
ROL Rule of law to assess the strength and impartiality of the legal system that 
protects property and individual rights. 
-0.078 0.677 
COC Control of corruption that accounts for bribes, excessive patronage and 
nepotism. 
-0.055 0.691 
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